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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred Under Rule 11 When It Corrected Villavicencio's Illegal 
Sentence In A Way That Vitiated The Parties' Binding Plea Agreement 
A Introduction 
In September 2005, to resolve three separate criminal cases, Villavicencio 
entered into a global binding Rule 11 plea agreement with the state. (See R., pp.44-
45.) The parties agreed that (1) Villavicencio would plead guilty to two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance and violating a no contact order; (2) the state 
would dismiss the remaining counts and cases against Villavicencio; (3) Villavicencio 
would receive consecutive sentences on each felony count of five years with one and a 
half years fixed, for a total sentence of ten years; (4) the district court would retain 
jurisdiction for 180 days; and (5) upon successful completion of the period of retained 
jurisdiction, Villavicencio would be placed on probation for a period of ten years. (Id.) 
The district court accepted the parties' agreement and so bound itself to the plea 
agreement. (R., p.48.) 
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court introduced a factual 
mistake into the proceedings when it misremembered that Villavicencio's underlying 
sentences had been concurrent, rather than consecutive. (Compare 3/6/2006 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.4-10 with R., pp.42, 45.) It therefore incorrectly placed Villavicencio on concurrent 
periods of probation, each for ten years, in its effort to comply with the parties' binding 
plea agreement, assuming that any error would be invited and so unchallengeable. (R., 
pp.97-103; 3/6/2006 Tr., p.7, L.4 - p.9, L.2.) When Villavicencio violated his probations 
seven and a half years later, he filed a Rule 35 motion to correct his sentence. (R., 
pp.208-10.) The district court (with a new judge presiding) determined that the 
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sentence was illegal and, rather than correct the sentence to reflect the parties' binding 
plea agreement, entered an order reducing Villavicencio's term of probation on all 
counts to seven years. (R., pp.256-59.) 
The state appealed from the district court's order, arguing that it erred by 
"correcting" Villavicencio's sentence in a way that in fact vitiated the parties' binding 
plea agreement. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-9.) The court should have corrected the 
sentence, not negated the plea agreement. In response, Villavicencio argues that the 
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to correct Villavicencio's sentence in a way 
that would comply with the binding plea agreement. (Respondent's brief, pp.6-14.) 
Villavicencio's argument fails. Jurisdiction is conferred by operation of statute or rule; 
Rule 35, by authorizing a court to correct an illegal sentence, allows the court the 
necessary jurisdiction to, in fact, correct the sentence. The district court's order should 
be vacated and this case remanded for resentencing consistent with the parties' binding 
Rule 11 plea agreement. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Whether a plea agreement has been breached is a question of law to be 
reviewed by the Court de nova, in accordance with contract law standards." State v. 
Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005) (citation omitted). 
C. The District Court Has Sufficient Jurisdiction To Correct Villavicencio's Sentence 
In A Way That Implements The Parties' Plea Agreement 
A plea agreement is contractual in nature and must be measured by contract law 
standards. State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 376, 233 P.3d 750, 759 (2010). When the 
court accepts the parties' binding plea agreement under Rule 11, the court is required to 
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"implement the disposition provided for in the plea agreement." I.C.R. 11 (f)(3). In its 
opening brief, the state conceded that Villavicencio should not have been placed on 
"concurrent probations" for a period of ten years; that sentence was based on a mistake 
of fact, was illegal, and needed to be corrected. (See Appellant's brief, pp.4, 6-7.) 
However, the condition that Villavicencio serve ten years of probation was not itself 
illegal and could have been accomplished through legal means. (Id.) Because that 
condition was part of the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the district court was required 
to correct Villavicencio's sentence in a way that implemented that term. Because the 
district court instead vitiated that condition and rendered the agreement inoperable, the 
district court erred and should be reversed. 
On appeal, Villavicencio contends that the district court lost jurisdiction over his 
case and therefore lacks legal authority to correctly structure his sentence consistent 
with the parties' binding plea agreement. (Respondent's brief, pp.6-11.) Seeking 
support for this argument, Villavicencio relies on State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 315 
P.3d 861 (Ct. App. 2013). In Kesling, the Court held that statutes which extend a 
court's jurisdiction for purposes of probation do not extend that jurisdiction beyond the 
maximum term of probation. ~ at 677, 315 P.3d 865. 
Kesling is not dispositive for two reasons. First, while the state recognizes that 
probation cannot exceed "the maximum period for which the defendant may be 
imprisoned," I.C. §§ 19-2601 (7), 20-222, multiple terms of probation can lawfully be run 
consecutively. State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260,266,141 P.3d 1129, 1135 (Ct. App. 
2006). Villavicencio was convicted of two counts of possession of methamphetamine 
and a violation of a no contact order. The maximum period of probation which could be 
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ordered for these crimes is not seven years, as Villavicencio claims on appeal. (See 
Respondent's brief, p.8.) Rather, it is 16 years-seven years for the possession of 
methamphetamine in Case No. CR-2005-2654, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1); seven years for the 
possession of methamphetamine in Case No. CR-2004-2777, id.; and two years for 
violating a no contact order in the latter case, I.C. § 19-2601(7). Because it is lawful to 
run all of these probations consecutively, the court was well within the maximum term of 
probation available and may appropriately restructure Villavicencio's sentence to reflect 
and implement the parties' binding plea agreement. 
Second, though Villavicencio asserts that his case is "virtually indistinguishable" 
from Kesling (Appellant's brief, p.10), he overlooks one major distinction: Unlike in 
Kesling, Villavicencio's sentence was arrived at through a binding Rule 11 plea 
agreement. The provision that Villavicencio serve a ten year term of probation, 
especially within the framework of that agreement which provided for consecutive 
underlying sentences of five years each, is legal. Because it is legal and was accepted 
by the court, it is mandatory for the court to implement the provision. I.C.R. 11 (f)(3). 
And, where provisions are mandatory, a court is even authorized under Rule 35 to 
increase a sentence if necessary to correct it. State v. Steelsmith, 153 Idaho 577, 582, 
288 P.3d 132, 137 (Ct. App. 2012). 
Villavicencio also asserts, contrary to precedent, that he is entitled to benefit from 
his plea agreement while depriving the state of its reciprocal benefits. (Respondent's 
brief, p.11.) To support this proposition, Villavicencio relies on State v. Armstrong, 146 
Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct. App. 2008). Villavicencio's reliance is misplaced. In 
Armstrong, the defendant entered into an initial plea agreement with the state in which 
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the state agreed not to request a psychosexual evaluation prior to sentencing. kl at 
373, 195 P .3d at 732. Later, Armstrong's probation officer requested Armstrong to 
submit to a psychosexual evaluation. kl When he refused, the probation officer 
brought a probation violation allegation against him. kl Armstrong claimed that 
requiring him to participate in the psychosexual evaluation violated his plea agreement 
and asserted that he should be allowed to withdraw the plea agreement. kl The 
district court determined that the state had not violated the plea agreement, but "in 
fairness," still permitted Armstrong to withdraw. kl 
The parties entered a second plea agreement. kl Following a period of retained 
jurisdiction, the court ordered a term of probation that exceeded the term agreed to in 
the second plea agreement and Armstrong appealed. kL. The Court, however, found 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to allow Armstrong to withdraw his guilty plea in 
the first place because Idaho Criminal Rule 33 does not include any provision extending 
the jurisdiction of the district court. kl at 377-78, 195 P.3d at 736-37. The Court 
therefore vacated the second order placing Armstrong on probation and enforced the 
parties' initial plea agreement. ~ at 378, 195 P.3d at 737. 
The Court's holding in Armstrong does not appear relevant to this case. Unlike 
Rule 33, Idaho Criminal Rule 35 does extend the court's jurisdiction to "correct a 
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any time." I.C.R. 35(a) (emphasis 
added); see also State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355 n.5, 79 P.3d 711, 714 n.5 (2003) 
(recognizing that Rule 35 extends a court's jurisdiction to permit a motion to correct an 
illegal sentence at any time). Because Rule 35 extends the court's jurisdiction, the court 
has jurisdiction to actually correct the sentence. 
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Ultimately, Villavicencio's argument is that Rule 35 affords the court sufficient 
jurisdiction to provide him with his preferred remedy, but insufficient jurisdiction to even 
consider the state's requested remedy. Because Rule 35(a) gives the court authority to 
correct an illegal sentence, it gives the court jurisdiction to actually correct the sentence. 
The district court has jurisdiction to correct Villavicencio's illegal sentence and must 
exercise its authority to correct that sentence in a way that implements the parties' 
binding Rule 11 plea agreement. 
Villavicencio's sentence was illegal. The parties do not dispute that the district 
court structured Villavicencio's sentence in an unlawful way. The parties also do not 
appear to dispute that the agreed-to provision, that Villavicencio be placed on probation 
for a period of ten years, could have been imposed lawfully. The only question before 
the Court is, what is the appropriate remedy to correct the illegal sentence? Because 
Rule 11 obligates the district court to "implement the disposition provided for in the plea 
agreement," the court must correct Villavicencio's sentence in a manner consistent with 
the agreement. The proper remedy under Rule 35 is to correct the sentence, not to 
negate the plea agreement. 
Because the district court's order violates Rule 11 and vitiates the parties' binding 
plea agreement, it should be reversed and this case remanded for further proceedings. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's amended 
judgment and remand this case for resentencing consistent with the parties' binding 
Rule 11 plea agreement. 
DATED this 31st day of March, 2015. 
C:u~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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